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·Recent Developments
Nissen Corp. v. Miller: MARYLAND ate under a new name, AT CorporaREJECTS THE CONTINUITY OF tion, for over five years until terminatENTERPRISE THEORY IN DE- ing operations in December of 1987.
In October of 1986, Brandt inTERMINING PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF SUCCESSOR COR- jured himself on the treadmill. One
PORATIONS.
year and eleven months later, Brandt
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 and his wife filed suit against Nissen
A.2d 564 (Md. 1991), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland adopted the general rule of non-liability of successor
corporations, with its four traditional
exceptions. In reaching its decision,
the court considered and expressly
rejected adding as a fifth exception,
the" continuity of enterprise" theory.
The court held that a corporation which
acquires all or part of the assets of
another corporation does not acquire
the liabilities and debts of the predecessor, unless the transaction comes
within one of the four well-recognized
exceptions. With the court's decision,
Maryland joined the majority of states
adhering to the traditional rule of nonliability of successor corporations and
its four exceptions.
In January of 1981, Frederick B.
Brandt purchased a treadmill which
was designed, manufactured and marketed by American Tredex Corporation ("Tredex"). In July of the same
year, Tredex sold its assets, including
inventory, patents and trademarks,
for an undisclosed sum to the Nissen
Corporation ("Nissen"). Nissen expressly agreed not to assume any liability for injuries arising from any
products previously sold by Tredex.
As contemplated in the asset purchase
agreem~nt, Tredex continued to oper16 - The Law Forum/22.2

claiming negligence, strict liability,
breach of implied and express warranties, and loss of consortium. The trial
court granted Nissen' s motion for summary judgment. Brandt appealed and
the court of special appeals reversed
the trial court. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether Nissen, as a successor
to American Tredex, was liable to
Brandt for his injuries. Nissen, 594
A.2d at 565.
The court of appeals first considered whether to adopt the general rule
of non-liability of successor corporations, with its four well-recognized
exceptions, and if so, whether it should
add a fifth exception for the " continuity of enterprise." [d. The general
rule, as stated in the court's opinion,
provided that a successor corporation
did not acquire the liabilities and debts
of the predecessor, unless (1) there
existed an express or implied agreement to assume liabilities, (2) the
corporations had in effect merged or
consolidated as a result of the transaction, (3) the successor corporation
was a "mere continuation" of the
previous corporation, or (4) the transaction was fraudulent, lacked good
faith or lacked adequate consideration.
[d. at 565-66 (citing American Law of

Products Liability 3d § 7: 1, at 10-12
(Travers, rev. ed. 1990».
The court of appeals then reviewed
Maryland case law and found that the
general rule and the four exceptions
had been accepted by the courts both
in logic and in theory. Nissen, 594
A.2d at 566. In fact, the first, second
and fourth exceptions had been expressly codified in the Maryland Annotated Code. [d. The third exception, known as the "mere continuation" or" continuity of entity" theory,
although never formally adopted or
codified, had been discussed and accepted in the dicta of the lower courts.
[d. (citing Baltimore Luggage v.
Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1989».
The only issue before the court,
therefore, was whether a fifth exception, the " continuity of enterprise"
theory, should be adopted. Nissen,
594 A.2d at 566. The continuity of
enterprise theory, adopted by a minority of states, focused on the continuation of a business operation or enterprise where there was no continuation
of ownership. [d. at 567. The exception was based on the theory that,
irrespective of fault, a party was accountable for the acts of another. [d.
Distinguishing this more "liberal"
exception from the "mere continuation" exception, the court stated that
the " gravamen of the traditional exception is the continuation of the corporate entity rather than continuation
of the business operation." [d. (emphasis in original).

Brandt argued that public policy
demanded that major corporations
should not be permitted " to purchase
only the benefits in an asset purchase
transaction, while denying its attendant liabilities to the consuming public." Id. Nissen countered that the
asset purchase agreement was a valid
and fully negotiated contract in which
the burden of liability for injuries
caused by defective products had been
expressly allocated to the predecessor
corporation. Id. Nissen urged the
court to adopt the general rule with
only the four traditional exceptions,
because the rule balanced the " rights
of creditors and successor corporations," as well as "maintain[ed] adequate protection for the interests of
consumers . . . from fraudulent and
unjust corporate transactions." Id. at
568.
Before reaching its decision, the
court of appeals considered the doctrine of strict liability and its concept
offault. Id. The court acknowledged
that public policy concerns for shifting the financial risk of loss to those
better able to bear it was a policy
consideration in adopting the doctrine
into Maryland law. Id. at 569 (citing
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)). The
court, however, emphasized that the
thrust of strict liability actions was
that the sellers of products were at
fault when they put a defective or
unreasonably dangerous product on
the market and a user was injured. Id.
at 569. The court found that a corporate successor" [was] not a seller,"
and therefore, not involved in " bringing the product and the user together. "
Id. In addressing the present case, the
court stated that it would be " unfair to
require a party to bear the cost of
unassumed and uncontemplated products liability claims primarily because
it [was] still in business and [was]
perceived as a 'deep pocket. ,,, Id.
The court lastly reviewed the holdings from a minority of states who
have adopted the continuity of enterprise theory. Id. at 571-73. In analyz-

ing these cases, the court failed to find Restatement should still serve as a
a compelling reason to deviate from guide in determining what informathe traditional corporate successor li- tion qualifies as a trade secret. The
ability rule. Id. at 573. The court court also upheld the part of Maryl and 's
concluded that the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secret Act providing
continuity of enterprise theory would for sanctions against parties who inibe inconsistent with Maryland law, tiate or maintain a claim in bad faith or
because it would require the court to without reasonable justification, but
abandon its fundamental principle that only if the claim was entirely without
there must be fault to impose tort color and imputed egregious behavliability. Id. at 574. Thus, the court ior.
Co-defendant Ross Agee worked
of appeals expressly rejected the continuity of enterprise theory. Because for Optic Graphics ("Optic"), an esBrandt's claim rested solely upon the tablished vinyl looseleaf binder manucourt's adopting that theory as a fifth facturer with a work force of nearly
exception, the court affirmed the trial 375 people and annual revenues of
court's decision granting Nissen's $27 million. Agee's responsibilities
initially included estimating costs remotion for summary judgment. Id.
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the lated to printing jobs for which Optic
Court of Appeals of Maryland for- intended to bid. Agee's duties remally adopted the general rule ofnon- quired that he have access to certain
liability of successor corporations, to- information which Optic considered
gether with its four traditional and confidential. As with all of its emwell-recognized exceptions. The rule ployees, the company maintained a
and the four exceptions were found to personnel file on Agee which included
be sufficient to protect both the inter- a confidentiality agreement.
Agee and his co-defendant,
ests of the consumer and business in
products liability cases. With the Michael Zanella, made efforts over a
court's decision, Maryland joined the number of years to join resources and
majority of states adhering to a tradi- buy a printing business. In June,
tional rule of non-liability of succes- 1989, without Optic's knowledge,
sor corporations with its four excep- Agee and Zanella took the opportunity
to buy a looseleaf bindery business
tions.
and formed what eventually became
- Linda M. Googins the third and final co-defendant in this
case, A to Z Looseleaf, Inc. (" A to
Optic Graphics, Inc. v.Agee: MARY- Z"). In order to obtain financing for
LAND COURT DEFINES " TRADE the deal, Agee and Zanella prepared a
SECRET" AND DETERMINES formal business plan including, among
WHEN SANCTIONS ARE APPRO- other things, a marketing strategy. By
PRIATEFOR BAD F AITII CLAIM October, 1989, they had secured a
UNDER MARYLAND UNIFORM loan which would lead to the settlement of their new business venture in
TRADE SECRET ACT.
February,
1990.
For the first time ever, an appelOptic
first found out about the
late court has examined the terms of
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret forthcoming A to Z when Agee reAct of 1989. In Optic Graphics, Inc. signed from his position with Optic in
v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578 (Md. Ct. Spec. December, 1989. At this time, A to Z
App. 1991), the Court of Special Ap- had no contracts, assets, customers,
peals of Maryland held that Maryland's or raw material orders. On January
Uniform Trade Secret Act protects a 24, 1990, Optic filed suit alleging that
broader scope of information as trade Agee had misappropriated Optic's
secrets than the Restatement of Torts. trade secrets and breached a confidenThe court noted, however, that the tiality agreement. Specifically, Optic
22.21The Law Forum - 17

